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We studied the distribution of WWI fighter pilots by the number of victories they were credited 
with along with casualty reports.  Using the maximum entropy method we obtained the 
underlying distribution of pilots by their skill. We find that the variance of this skill 
distribution is not very large, and that the top aces achieved their victory scores mostly by luck. 
For example, the ace of aces, Manfred von Richthofen, most likely had a skill in the top quarter 
of the active WWI German fighter pilots, and was no more special than that. When combined 
with our recent study [10], showing that fame grows exponentially with victory scores, these 
results (derived from real data) show that both outstanding achievement records and resulting 
fame are mostly due to chance.  
 
During the “Manhattan project” (the making of nuclear bomb), physicist Enrico Fermi asked General 
Leslie Groves, the head of the project, what is the definition of a “great” general [1]. Groves replied 
that any general who had won five battles in a row might safely be called great. Fermi then asked how 
many generals are great. Groves said about three out of every hundred. Fermi conjectured that if the 
chance of winning one battle is 1/2 then the chance of winning five battles in a row is 32121 5 = .  “So 
you are right, General, about three out of every hundred. Mathematical probability, not genius.” 
Similarly to a great general, an ace is a fighter pilot who achieved five or more victories. Can 
the latter   be explained by simple probability, like the former? At first glance this does not appear to 
be so, as some aces scored way too many   victories. For example, the probability to achieve by pure 
chance Manfred von Richthofen’s 80 victories is 2480 1021 −≈ . One is tempted to conclude that high-
scoring aces had outstanding skills. 
A more careful analysis proves this conclusion wrong. During WWI British Empire Air Forces 
fully credited their pilots for moral1 victories (Ref. [2], p.6). It is not that unlikely to achieve five 
moral victories if you can have five moral defeats in between. In addition British Air Force fully 
credited their pilots for shared victories (Ref. [2], p.8).   That is if e.g. three British airplanes shot one 
German airplane – all three were credited with a victory. The French did not count moral victories, but 
allowed for shared ones (Ref. [3], p.6). The Americans were either under French or British command 
and had the corresponding rules applied to them. In contrast, the Germans had ideal scoring system 
(Ref. [4], p.6-7). They did not count moral victories. The opponent aircraft had to be either destroyed 
or forced to lend on German territory and its crew taken prisoners. They did not allow shared victories 
as well2. This was in theory. In practice, however, military historians   “have found a number of 
                                                 
1
 For example, forcing the enemy aircraft to land within enemy lines, driving it down “out of control”, 
or driving it down in damaged condition (Ref. [2], p.6). 
2
 This brought another problem. It happened that there were two or more claims for one destroyed 
opponent aircraft. Military historians had found that “In some of these cases rank or being a higher 
scoring ace helped win the decision over a more lowly pilot” (Ref. [4], p.7).  Several such cases are 
documented in Ref. [5]:  Vizefeldwebel (Sergeant-Major) Boldt claimed a victory, but it was also 
claimed by and awarded to Ltn von Schönebeck (Ref. [5], p.108);  Vizefeldwebel (Sergeant-Major) 
Hegeler claimed a victory, but it was also claimed by and awarded to Ltn d R Müller (Ref. [5], p.157).  
This phenomenon, if widespread, can alone generate aces through the cumulative advantage 
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‘victories’ where, say, three Allied aircraft have been claimed and credited when there is absolutely no 
doubt that only one or two of those Allied planes were lost” (Ref. [4], p.7). This means that in reality 
some moral or shared victories were counted by the Germans. 
Ref. [5] contains the list of all German WWI fighter pilots, with all of their victories and 
casualties.  The total number of credited victories is 67593. The number of casualties, however, is a lot 
smaller4.  They amount to 618 KIA (killed in action), 52 WIA/DOW (wounded in action and later died 
of wounds), 140 POW (prisoner of war), and 431 WIA (wounded in action and survived). According 
to the official German scoring system, for a pilot to be credited with a victory his opponent should be 
killed or taken prisoner. Let us compute the number of defeats suffered by the Germans using their 
own scoring system for victories.  Obviously, KIA, WIA/DOW, and POW should be counted as 
defeats. These add up to 810. This is by a factor of 8.3 less than the number of credited victories. We 
are not supposed to include WIA in defeats if we wish to follow the German scoring system. However, 
even if we count all of the WIA as defeats we get 1,241 defeats, which is still by a factor of 5.4 less 
than the number of credited victories. 
We don’t know for sure why the number of victories exceeds the number of casualties by such a 
large factor, but can suggest several possible reasons: 
 
• Moral and shared victories. 
• Aces flew fighter-planes, while their opponents often were less well armed aircraft.  
• German Air Force fought mostly defensive war behind their front lines [4].   So, if a German 
aircraft was shot down, it could land on their territory. In contrast, when Allied aircraft was 
shot down, it had to land on the enemy territory and its pilot was taken  prisoner.  
• The Germans were better.   
 
Fortunately, we don’t need to know the exact reason to compare German fighter pilots between 
themselves. Let us, given the statistics of defeats and victories, compute the probability to get 
Richthofen’s score.  German pilots were credited with 6759 victories (this number probably includes 
moral and shared victories). Germans also recorded 810 defeats. The total number of engagements was 
probably not 6759 + 810, but 6759 + 810 + X. Here X is the unknown number of moral defeats. As 
long as moral defeat does not affect the ability of a pilot to participate in further battles we don’t need 
to know X. We will call a “recorded engagement” an engagement which resulted in either credited 
victory or in a defeat. The rate of defeat in recorded engagements is 107.0
8106759
810
≈
+
=r . The 
probability of 80 victories in a row is ( ) 480 1017.11 −×≈− r . The probability that at least one of 2894 
German fighter pilots will achieve 80 or more victories is ( ) 29.01017.111 28944 ≈×−− − . Richthofen’s 
score is thus within the reach of chance. We can also compute the probability distribution of the 
victory scores, assuming that everyone fights until he gets killed. The probability to win n fights and 
lose the next is: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
mechanism. However, we   have no evidence that this practice was widespread, and will ignore its 
effect in this study. 
3
 This number is the sum of 5050 victories credited to aces and 1709 victories credited to non-ace 
pilots. The first number is accurate (in the sense that no new error was introduced in this study), as 
aces victory scores are available in electronic format (for example on this website: 
http://www.theaerodrome.com/aces/).  The second number is a result of the hand-count using the 
listing in Ref. [5], so some error was most likely introduced.   
4
 The casualties, which are listed on pages 345-357 of Ref. [5], were manually counted.  
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( ) ( ) rrnP n−= 1           (1) 
 
Figure 1 shows the result of Eq.(1) (with 107.0=r ) compared with the actual distribution of the 
victory scores (which are given in Table 1). While the agreement is not perfect, it is clear that chance 
can account for most of the variance in the numbers of victories. 
  
Apart from not leading to a quantitative agreement with the data, the above simple analysis assumes 
that fighter pilots always fight until they get killed.  In reality many of them did not even look for a 
fight. There were over eight hundred German fighter-pilots who did not score a single victory and also 
were never wounded or shot down.  Also   many pilots with just few victories survived the war. In 
many of such cases they joined the Air Force shortly before the end of the war. 
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Figure 1. The distribution of German WWI fighter-pilots by the number of victories, computed using 
the data in Table 1, is shown by rhombs. The line is the predicted distribution, computed using Eq.(1) 
with 107.0=r . 
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Table 1. Distribution of pilots by number of victories. 
 
number of 
credited 
victories
total 
number of 
pilots
un-
defeated
defeated 
in the next 
fight
number of 
credited 
victories
total 
number of 
pilots
un-
defeated
defeated 
in the next 
fight
0 1567 1133 434
1 469 331 138 23 1 1 0
2 252 182 70 24 2 1 1
3 120 90 30 25 3 1 2
4 94 64 30 26 3 2 1
5 60 47 13 27 6 4 2
6 59 47 12 28 5 4 1
7 36 27 9 29 1 1 0
8 39 27 12 30 5 3 2
9 20 15 5 31 2 1 1
10 19 13 6 32 2 2 0
11 15 11 4 33 3 2 1
12 18 12 6 35 5 5 0
13 11 5 6 36 3 2 1
14 4 3 1 39 2 1 1
15 15 9 6 40 3 2 1
16 6 4 2 43 1 1 0
17 8 7 1 44 2 2 0
18 3 2 1 45 1 0 1
19 4 3 1 48 2 1 1
20 10 6 4 54 1 0 1
21 4 1 3 62 1 1 0
22 6 3 3 80 1 0 1
continued
 
 
 
A better way to address the problem is to study the probability of defeat as a function of the 
number of previous victories. Table 2 shows the statistics of casualties (KIA + WIA/DOW +POW) as 
a function of the number of previous victories. For example, 434 pilots were defeated before they 
achieved a single victory. At the same time 1321 pilots achieved one or more victory. This makes the 
rate of defeat in the first fight 247.0
1327434
434
≈
+
. Similarly 30 people were defeated after they 
achieved 4 victories, while 392 pilots achieved 5 or more victories (and became aces). This makes the 
rate of defeat in the fifth fight 071.0
39230
30
≈
+
.  
The rate of defeat computed this way using the data of Table 2 is shown in Fig.2. The rate 
drops strongly for the first few fights, but appears not to change after about ten fights. The reduction in 
rate of defeat can be explained assuming that pilots have different innate rate of defeat, which depends 
on their skill. The unskilled ones get killed at a higher rate, and, as we progress to higher number of 
fights, the average skill increases. Variance in innate skill is one possible explanation. Another 
explanation is that the pilots simply get more experienced. A hard-core idealist can attribute all the 
decrease of the defeat rate with the increase of the fight number to learning.  In reality both factors 
play role and their relative contributions are impossible to determine. In the following analysis we 
assume that a defeat rate is innate to a pilot and does not change with the number of fights he 
participates in. 
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Table 2. Numbers of defeated and winning pilots   as functions of the fight number. 
 
fight 
number
number of 
defeats
number of 
victories
fight 
number
number of 
defeats
number of 
victories
1 434 1327
2 138 858 42 0 9
3 70 606 43 0 9
4 30 486 44 0 8
5 30 392 45 0 6
6 13 332 46 1 5
7 12 273 47 0 5
8 9 237 48 0 5
9 12 198 49 1 3
10 5 178 50 0 3
11 6 159 51 0 3
12 4 144 52 0 3
13 6 126 53 0 3
14 6 115 54 0 3
15 1 111 55 1 2
16 6 96 56 0 2
17 2 90 57 0 2
18 1 82 58 0 2
19 1 79 59 0 2
20 1 75 60 0 2
21 4 65 61 0 2
22 3 61 62 0 2
23 3 55 63 0 1
24 0 54 64 0 1
25 1 52 65 0 1
26 2 49 66 0 1
27 1 46 67 0 1
28 2 40 68 0 1
29 1 35 69 0 1
30 0 34 70 0 1
31 2 29 71 0 1
32 1 27 72 0 1
33 0 25 73 0 1
34 1 22 74 0 1
35 0 22 75 0 1
36 0 17 76 0 1
37 1 14 77 0 1
38 0 14 78 0 1
39 0 14 79 0 1
40 1 12 80 0 1
41 1 9 81 1 0
continued
 
 
 6 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
fight number
de
fe
a
t r
a
te
 
Figure 2. The actual defeat rate as a function of fight number, determined using the data of Table 2, is 
shown by rhombs. The line represents the same rate, theoretically computed using the distribution of 
the rate of defeat in the pool of pilots given in Fig. 3. The error bars are of the size of one standard 
deviation, which corresponds to 68% confidence interval. 
 
If the distribution of the innate defeat rates is ( )rp  then the average rate of defeat in first fight 
is ( )drrprr ∫=
1
0
1 . The probability distribution of defeat rate of pilots surviving the first fight 
is ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) rdrpr
rpr
rp
′′′−
−
=
∫
1
0
1
1
1
. The rate of defeat in the second fight is ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )drrpr
drrprr
drrprr
∫
∫
∫
−
−
== 1
0
1
0
1
1
0
2
1
1
.  
 
In general, the probability distribution of defeat rates of pilots, surviving n fights, is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) rdrpr
rpr
rp
n
n
n
′′′−
−
=
∫
1
0
1
1
,          (2) 
 
and the rate of defeat in nth fight is: 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )drrpr
drrpr
drrpr
drrprr
r
n
n
n
n
n
∫
∫
∫
∫
−−
−
−
−
−=
−
−
= 1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
.       (3) 
Obviously, nr  , given by Eq.(3), monotonically decreases with n. When the minimum defeat rate in the 
distribution ( )rp  is greater than zero, nr  approaches this rate at some value of n and then decreases no 
further. Fig. 2 suggests that this minimum defeat rate is around 3%. 
One can use Eq.(3) to compute the defeat rates for trial distributions, ( )rp , and search for the 
distribution which best fits the data of Fig. 2. However, a better way to find ( )rp  is to use the method 
of maximum likelihood [6]. Let us consider an undefeated pilot with n victories. We assume that he 
was selected at random from a pool where defeat rates are distributed according to ( )rp . The 
probability that a randomly selected pilot, who participates in n battles, wins all of them is:  
( ) ( )( )∫ −=
1
0
1 nrrdrpnP . 
Similarly, the probability that a randomly selected pilot wins n battles and loses the next is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )11
1
0
+−=−= ∫ nPnPrrrdrpnP
nd
. 
Now the probability to get the whole set of data in Table 1 is given by the likelihood function: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )∏=
n
nNdnN
d
nPnPf  
where ( )nN  and ( )nN d  are the numbers of undefeated and defeated pilots with n victories. We should 
find the distribution ( )rp  which maximize this function. 
 In computations it is more convenient to work with the logarithm of the likelihood function: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]∑ +=
n
dd nPnNnPnNf lnlnln .       (4) 
 
The distribution, ( )rp , obtained by maximizing f  (see the Appendix)   is shown in Fig. 3 by rhombs. It 
looks irregular.  
The maximum likelihood estimation we just performed assumed that all possible 
distributions, ( )rp , are, a priori, equally probable. The Maximum Entropy Principle [7] provides a 
more reasonable way of assigning a priori probabilities to distributions. As we are inferring a 
probability distribution then the relevant entropy is the information (Shannon) entropy [8]: 
 
( ) ( )( )∫−=
1
0
ln rprdrps            (5) 
A priori probability of a given probability distribution, ( )rp , is se∝ [7]. The combined probability of 
realizing a particular distribution and that this distribution produces the observed data is fe s ×~ . 
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This is the quantity which should be maximized, or, alternatively, its logarithm, ( ) sf +ln , which is 
more convenient. The result of this maximization is shown in Fig. 3 by a line. The defeat rate as a 
function of fight number, computed using this distribution and Eq.(3)  is shown in Fig.2 by a line.  
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Figure 3. Distribution of the rate of defeat computed using maximum likelihood method (rhombs).  
Solid line is the distribution computed by combining the maximum likelihood and the maximum 
entropy method. 
 
Now we can use ( )rp  to do Bayesian inference [6] for intrinsic defeat rate of any given pilot 
(including those who were never defeated5). We will use ( )rp  as a prior distribution of defeat rate and 
will make an estimate of pilot’s defeat rate based on this prior distribution and actual number of fights 
he won and lost. For example, if we don’t know how many fights a pilot had won, then all we can say 
is that the probability distribution of his defeat rate is ( )rp . If we know that he won n fights, then the 
probability distribution of his defeat rate is the probability distribution of defeat rates of pilots, who 
won n fights, which is given by Eq.(2). The same inference for defeat rate for pilots, who won n fights 
and were defeated in the next, can be obtained similarly: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) rdrprr
rprr
rp
n
n
d
n
′′′−′
−
=
∫
1
0
1
1
          (6) 
                                                 
5
 Similar approach was previously used to estimate the true dropped calls rates when no dropped calls 
happened during the test [9]. 
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The inference for five representative pilots, computed using Eqs. (2) and (6) is given in Fig. 4.  In 
particular, Manfred von Richthofen most likely had the intrinsic defeat rate of 2.5%.  According to the 
distribution of intrinsic defeat rates shown in Fig. 3 about 27% of pilots have the defeat rate of 2.5% or 
lower. This means that MvR is most likely merely in top 27% according to his skill.  
 Note that we completely neglected the effects of learning in our analysis. It is clear that at least 
part of the variation in perceived ability is due to the fact that pilots are getting more experienced as 
they participate in more and more fights. Thus taking into account the effects of learning will make the 
variance in innate ability only less. Consequently, our estimate of the uniqueness of MvR is an upper 
bound. 
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Figure 4. Bayesian inference for the defeat rate of five aces, computed using the distribution, shown in 
Fig. 3, and Eqs.(2) and (6). Undefeated aces (number of victories in brackets): Ernst Udet (62), Werner 
Junck (5). Defeated aces:  Manfred von Richthofen (80), Max Immelmann (15), Kurt Wissemann (5). 
 
In our previous paper on the theory of aces [10] we found a strong correlation between the 
logarithm of fame (measured in numbers of Google hits) and the achievement (number of victories), 
suggesting that fame grows exponentially with achievement. In other words fame gives increasing 
return on achievement, but still is determined by this achievement. This would be acceptable if 
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achievement was proportional to skill. However, now we have shown that the difference in the number 
of victories is mostly due to chance. This means that the fame in the end is due to chance. There were 
a couple of papers ([11], [12]) which speculated, using arguments akin to the one by Fermi in the 
beginning of the article, that people can be perceived as having extraordinary ability when in reality 
they are simply lucky. However, this paper is the first one, which argues it using real data. 
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Appendix (The maximization algorithm) 
The method used is as follows. The defeat rates are discretized: krk ×+= 01.0005.0  , k = 0,…,99. The 
probability also is discretized in 1000 units of 0.001. These 1000 units of probability are initially 
distributed at random over the 100 defeat rates. Then we use the following maximization algorithm. 
Start with k = 0. Reduce the number of probability units at k = 0 (if there is any) by one. Tentatively 
move this probability unit to k = 0,…,99 and compute ( )fln  in each case. Stick with the move which 
maximizes ( )fln . Proceed to k = 1 and repeat the procedure and so on. After k = 99 go back to k = 0 
and repeat the whole cycle. Stop when no further move increases ( )fln .   
 The whole run was repeated 500 times each time starting with a different random probability 
distribution. These runs ended up in 33 distinct “local” maximums. The result of the most successful 
run is shown in Fig. 3. Note, that all of the runs produced very similar probability distributions. The 
best run resulted in the likelihood, exceeding that of the worst run by the factor of only 1.002. 
 The maximum entropy case was treated exactly the same way. The only difference was that 
( )fln  was replaced with ( ) ( )sf lnln + . One hundred runs ended up in the same maximum. 
 
